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We analyze theoretically performance of four-state quantum key distribution protocols
implemented with a realistic heralded single-photon source. The analysis assumes a noisy
model for the detector heralding generation of individual photons via spontaneous para-
metric down-conversion, including dark counts and imperfect photon number resolution.
We identify characteristics of the heralding detector that defines the attainable crypto-
graphic key rate and the maximum secure distance. Approximate analytical formulas are
applied to multiplexed detection and compared with results of numerical calculations.
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1. Introduction
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) is guaranteed by the fundamental
impossibility to discriminate with certainty non-orthogonal quantum states of an
individual physical system.1,2 Single photons are an obvious choice for such a sys-
tem owing to easy preparation and detection of non-orthogonal states, combined
with stable and robust long-haul transmission in optical fibers as well as in free
space.3 This makes single photon sources an essential component of many practical
QKD setups.4
Realistic single photon sources suffer from two imperfections. The first one is
occasional generation of two or more photons within a given temporal bin. This
opens up a possibility of a successful eavesdropping attack based on photon num-
ber splitting, when an eavesdropper is able to capture and measure the state of one
1
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of the transmitted photons without revealing her presence. The second imperfec-
tion is the production of empty vacuum bins, when no photon is actually present.
This lowers the key generation rate and, more importantly, increases the relative
contribution of dark counts produced by detectors used in the receiver setup. If the
security analysis conservatively attributes errors introduced by dark counts to the
action of an eavesdropper, this ultimately limits the maximum distance of secure
communication.
The simplest approximate realisation of a single photon state is a weak coherent
pulse (WCP) derived from a heavily attenuated pulsed laser beam. The Poissonian
statistics for the number of photons carried by such a pulse leads to a trade-off
between the importance of multiphoton events and vacuum events. This defines the
optimal pulse intensity to be used in a QKD protocol.5 A more advanced approach
is to use a heralded single-photon source based on the process of spontaneous para-
metric down-conversion (SPDC), in which pump photons spontaneously decay into
photon pairs.3,6 Ideally, detecting one, idler photon from a pair unambiguously her-
alds the availability of the second, signal photon that can be subsequently used for
a cryptographic protocol. This removes the vacuum component from the generated
state.5 Further, using a photon number resolving detector for heralding would elim-
inate the multiphoton component in the down-converted light beam. Consequently,
the down-conversion process could be operated at higher pump powers, increasing
the effective generation rate for single photons.
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze theoretically the performance of
realistic heralded single photon sources based on SPDC and photon number resolv-
ing detectors in the standard BB84 protocol. In practice, the attractive features of
heralded sources can be compromised by a number of imperfections. Typical down-
conversion sources do not guarantee perfect photon number correlations between
signal and idler photons: usually, there is a trade-off between collection efficien-
cies for the signal and the idler arms, especially when bulk nonlinear media are
employed.7,8,9 Further, non-unit detection efficiency of the heralding detector un-
dermines its photon number resolving capability, while dark counts in the heralding
arm result in vacuum events in the signal arm. Starting from a general model for a
realistic photon number resolving detector, we will identify its characteristics that
is relevant for QKD applications. This generalizes earlier results obtained for a her-
alded source with a binary on/off detector.5 The introduced formalism allows us
also to discuss selected security aspects of other qubit-based four-state protocols,
such as SARG0410 which offers partial protection against multiphoton events.
In our analysis we leave aside protocols exploiting the decoy-state
method11,12,13,14 which estimates the contribution from multiphoton events by
preparing light pulses with variable photon statistics and measuring correspond-
ing detection probabilities. Such a strategy can enhance substantially the scaling
of the key rate with the transmission of the optical channel from quadratic to a
linear one. SPDC can be used in this approach as a universal source to generate ap-
proximate single photons along with required decoy states,15,16,17,18 conditioned
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upon the measurement outcome on the heralding detector. One can also consider
utilizing heralded single photons generated by SPDC as signal pulses,19 although
optimization over the pump power would yield unrealistically high requirements
for the efficiency of the down-conversion process. A way out would be to arrange
an array of weakly pumped down-conversion sources20 followed by a multiport
switch picking up a photon from a source flagged by the respective heralding detec-
tor. However, the complexity of such a setup would lead in practice to additional
losses that might easily compromise its performance. Decoy-state techniques re-
quire a careful analysis of a much broader range of eavesdropping strategies in
multiple degrees of freedom,21 and their statistical aspects are significantly more
complex12,14,17,22 compared to the effects of finite-length data in standard single-
photon protocols.23,24 This motivated us to reexamine the performance of heralded
single photons in quantum key distribution under the conservative assumptions of
non-decoy schemes.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we introduce basic expressions that
characterize the performance of the QKD protocol with a heralded single-photon
source. The short-distance limit, when dark counts can be neglected, is discussed
analytically in Sec. 3. In Sec. 4 we give approximate expressions for the maximum
secure distance. These results are compared in Sec. 5 with numerical results and
the advantages of multiplexed heralding are discussed. Finally, Sec. 6 concludes the
paper.
2. Key rate
We will consider here the standard physical layer of the BB84 protocol: Alice pre-
pares one of four qubit states that form two mutually unbiased bases, while Bob
switches between projective measurements in one of these two bases and directs two
orthogonal states to separate detectors. For simplicity we assume that errors are
the same in both bases,25 which is a reasonable model for phase and polarization
encodings. The starting point of our discussion will be an expression for the key rate
K as a function of the quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q determined by Alice and
Bob from the statistics of events, and the fraction y of detection events generated
by pulses that genuinely contained a single photon. We assume that Eve performs
a photon number splitting attack, capturing one photon and letting the second
one travel without any disturbance. We will approximate her information gain for
multiphoton pulses by its value for two-photon cases I
(2)
AE , taken as independent
of Q. We also assume that the observed QBER stems entirely from an attack on
single-photon pulses, and that Eve prevents any detection events to occur at Bob’s
side when Alice sends a vacuum pulse. These assumptions lead to the following
expression for the secure key rate
K = pexppsift[IAB(Q)− yI(1)AE(Q/y)− (1− y)I
(2)
AE ], (1)
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where pexp is the total expected probability of a detection event, psift is the fraction
of all the events contributing to the raw key, and I
(1)
AE(Q/y) is Eve’s information
gain for single-photon pulses, calculated for the QBER rescaled by y to account
for the multiphoton fraction that is assumed to introduce no errors. The quality of
the raw key is characterized by the mutual information IAB(Q) between Alice and
Bob, equal to
IAB(Q) = 1−H(Q), (2)
where H(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary entropy. For the standard
BB84 protocol we have psift = 1/2, as bases chosen by Alice and Bob are compatible
in 50% of the cases. Eve’s collective attack on single-photon pulses yields mutual
information equal to I
(1)
AE(Q) = H(Q),
2 while the photon number splitting attack
makes two-photon pulses completely insecure and consequently I
(2)
AE = 1.
The formula assumed in Eq. (1) can be applied also to certain eavesdropping
strategies for other protocols. As an example we will consider here the SARG04
protocol. In this case we will take psift ≈ 1/4, neglecting a minor change in this
value for a non-zero QBER. Eve’s collective attack on single-photon pulses results
in her information gain described by an expression26
I
(1)
AE(Q) = (1 −Q) log2(1−Q)− (1 − 2Q) log2(1 − 2Q) +Q(1− log2Q). (3)
Further, if Eve applies the photon number splitting attack to two-photon pulses
and attempts to infer the key bits only from retained photons, her task is more
difficult than in the BB84 protocol since the information revealed publicly by the
legitimate parties does not identify unambiguously the measurement basis. In fact,
having learned the public information, Eve is left with the problem of discrimi-
nating between two equiprobable non-orthogonal states with the absolute value of
their scalar product equal to 1/
√
2. Consequently, her maximal information gain is
bounded by the Holevo quantity27 calculated for this ensemble, which yields the
value
I
(2)
AE = H
(
(2 +
√
2)/4
)
≈ 0.6009. (4)
We do not exploit here the possibility of extracting the key from multiphoton
events.28
In the following, key rates calculated using the two sets of formulas for the
BB84 and SARG04 protocols will be denoted respectively as KBB84 and KSARG04.
It should be noted that the eavesdropping model considered here makes sense as
long as Eve’s information gain from multiphoton pulses exceeds that from single
photon events, i.e. I
(1)
AE(Q/y) ≤ I
(2)
AE . If this condition does not hold, the photon
number splitting attack is not effective and it should be replaced by a more general
multiphoton attack. For the BB84 protocol, the condition I
(1)
AE(Q/y) ≤ I
(2)
AE is
satisfied automatically, as multiphoton events are completely insecure. In the case
of the eavesdropping strategy for the SARG04 protocol described above one needs
to restrict applicability to sufficiently low ratios Q/y. This issue will be highlighted
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in Sec. 4. The consistency of the obtained results with the assumptions made in
the security analysis should be checked numerically when applying results derived
in this paper to a specific experimental scenario.
In the next step, we need to relate the parameters pexp, Q, and y to the proper-
ties of the actual physical setup. We will consider a heralded single photon source
based on a multi-mode SPDC process, in which the statistics of the number of gen-
erated pairs is well approximated by the Poissonian distribution.21 Consequently,
the probabilities pn of generating n = 0 and n = 1 pairs can be written respectively
as p0 = e
−λ and p1 = λe
−λ, where λ ≪ 1 is defined by the pump power and the
strength of the nonlinear interaction. The probability of producing two or more
pairs is given by p2 = 1 − p0 − p1 = 1 − (1 + λ)e−λ. In the perturbative regime
of weak pumping the dominant contribution to multiple events comes from genera-
tion of double photon pairs, and our security analysis will assume that all multiple
events are of this form.
One of the down-converted photons, used as a herald, is measured by a detector
on Alice’s side. Only events in which Alice’s detector signalled the presence of
exactly one photon are retained by Alice and Bob. Let us denote by qi, i = 0, 1, 2,
the conditional probability that the heralding detector generated this outcome,
provided that it received i photons. For an ideal photon number resolving detector
we have q1 = 1 and q0 = q2 = 0. Deviations from this perfect characteristics
will have a critical impact on the performance of the source. The results for weak
coherent pulses are recovered for the no-heralding case q0 = q1 = q2 = 1.
Two other relevant parameters are the transmission of the optical channel from
Alice to Bob multiplied by Bob’s detection efficiency, denoted here by a single pa-
rameter T , and the probability of a dark count on each of Bob’s two detectors
dB ≪ 1. The expected overall probability of a detection event is given by an ex-
pression:
pexp = Tp1q1 + 2Tp2q2 + 2dB(p0q0 + p1q1 + p2q2), (5)
where we ignored double-count events described by terms of the order of TdB, T
2
and d2B. As on average half of dark count events generate errors for both BB84 and
SARG04 protocols, the QBER is given by
Q =
dB
pexp
(p0q0 + p1q1 + p2q2). (6)
This QBER level will be interpreted as a result of Eve’s attack on single-photon
pulses. Finally, the fraction of detection events that can be attributed to single
photons is
y = 1− p2q2
pexp
. (7)
In the following sections we will discuss performance of QKD in the regime of short
distances on one hand and derive an approximate expression for the maximum
secure distance on the other hand. These results will be compared with complete
numerical calculations based on general formulas introduced above.
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3. Short distance limit
In order to gain intuition about differences between various realizations of the
protocol, let us first consider the short-distance limit when the overall transmission
of the optical channel is relatively high so that the number of detection events
generated by actual photons substantially exceeds that triggered by dark counts.
In this case, simple estimates on the key rates can be obtained by entirely neglecting
dark counts on Bob’s detectors. Under this assumption, the expression for the key
rate simplifies to the form
K = pexppsift[1− (1− y)I(2)AE ] = psift[Tp1q1 − p2q2(I
(2)
AE − 2T )],
which can be used for both BB84 and SARG04 protocols by a suitable choice of psift
and I
(2)
AE . In order to optimize the performance of the protocol, we need to maximize
the right hand side of the above formula with respect to the pump strength λ. The
maximum is reached at
λshort =
Tq1
Tq1 + (I
(2)
AE − 2T )q2
. (8)
In the regime when Tq1 ≪ (I(2)AE − 2T )q2 we can approximate λshort ≈ Tq1/[I
(2)
AE −
2T ]q2 and take p1 ≈ λshort, p2 ≈ λ2short/2. This yields the following compact formula
for the key rate:
K ≈ q
2
1
q2
psiftT
2
2(I
(2)
AE − 2T )
. (9)
It will be convenient to use the superscript (C) for quantities specialized to the case
of WCPs, while the superscript (H) will denote quantities calculated for a general
heralded single photon source. It is seen that properties of the detector enter through
the factor q21/q2. Because for WCPs q
2
1/q2 = 1, we immediately obtain that
K(H) =
q21
q2
K(C). (10)
The above formula provides a simple criterion to characterize the usefulness of
the heralded source for short distances. Let us note here that in order to ensure
consistency of the above estimates with the perturbative treatment of the photon
number distribution, we should assume that λshort ≪ 1. This means that the chan-
nel transmission is low enough and the detector is sufficiently imperfect to carry out
calculations in the perturbative regime, but at the same time the rate of detection
events is high enough to neglect the dark counts on Bob’s detectors.
As an exemplary application of Eq. (10), let us consider an N -stage tree beam
splitting scheme shown in Fig. 1, which formally is equivalent to time-multiplexed
detection.29,30 At each stage, the input light is split into twice as many beams using
balanced couplers. The output ports are monitored with binary detectors charac-
terized by the efficiency ηA and the dark count probability dA. A straightforward
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Fig. 1. A schematic of a multiplexing detector splitting the input signal using balanced couplers,
each with overall transmission ηc, and directing outputs to individual binary detectors character-
ized by the efficiency ηA and the dark count rate dA.
calculation based on classical probability theory yields the following expressions for
conditional probabilities qi:
q0 = (1− dA)2
N
−12NdA,
q1 = (1− dA)2
N
−1[2NdA(1− ηA) + ηA], (11)
q2 = (1− dA)2
N
−1[2NdA(1− ηA)2 + 2ηA(1− ηA) + 2−Nη2A].
These formulas assume lossless 50/50 couplers used in the multiplexing detector. In
order to consider realistic lossy couplers with overall power transmission ηc each,
we will replace in the above expressions ηA by ηAη
N
c .
For high count rates, in the first approximation we can neglect dark counts also
on Alice’s detector. Then the ratio q21/q2 is given explicitly by a compact formula
q21
q2
=
1
2/(ηAηNc )− 2 + 2−N
. (12)
It is seen that if ηc = 100%, increasing the number of stages improves the ratio q
2
1/q2
and the standard expression for a photon number resolving detector is recovered
in the limit N → ∞. This however relies critically on the assumption of perfectly
lossless couplers, as otherwise the effective efficiency ηAη
N
c tends to zero.
The heralded source yields a higher key rate than weak coherent pulses when
q21/q2 > 1, which can be written as the following condition on Alice’s detector
efficiency:
ηAη
N
c >
2
3− 2−N . (13)
For a binary heralding detector, which corresponds to N = 0, the heralded source
cannot bring any advantage over weak coherent pulses in the short distance regime.
In the limit of full photon number resolution, when N →∞, the efficiency of the
heralding detector should exceed ηAη
N
c > 2/3 to offer an improvement over weak
coherent pulses. As ηA includes also the collection efficiency of heralding photons,
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this poses rather stringent requirements on heralded single photon sources to be
useful in the short distance regime.
In the following sections we will see that heralded sources warrant security over
significantly longer distances compared to weak coherent pulses, and that the short-
distance approximation presented above works for heralded sources well beyond the
maximum secure distance of the WCP scheme. In this case, we need to compare
factors q21/q2 calculated for binary and multiplexed heralding. The expression de-
rived in Eq. (12) suggests that for favourable technical parameters multiplexing can
boost the secret key rate.
4. Maximum distance
We will now consider the other limiting case and estimate the maximum distance—
or equivalently the minimum transmission of the optical channel—over which a
secure key can be established. For low transmission, a larger fraction of events
is generated by dark counts, which increases the value of QBER. We will focus
our attention on the regime when the sender cannot afford to produce too many
multiphoton events which would provide Eve with more information than single
photons without contributing to the QBER. In this regime we can linearize the
condition for the positivity of the key to the form
Q < Qth[1− ξ(1 − y)], (14)
where Qth is the threshold QBER for an ideal single photon source obtained from
the equation IAB(Q
th) = I
(1)
AE(Q
th), and ξ is the proportionality factor that char-
acterizes the effective reduction in this value introduced by the fraction of multi-
photon events. These two parameters depend on the protocol under consideration
and their numerical values are Qth ≈ 0.11 and ξ ≈ 1.25 for the BB84 protocol
and Qth ≈ 0.0968 and ξ ≈ 0.64 for the SARG04 protocol. In Fig. 2, this linearized
condition is superimposed on the contour plots of the renormalized key rate K/pexp
calculated for BB84 and SARG04 protocols. Note that for the SARG04 protocol,
the applicability is restricted by the condition I
(1)
AE(Q/y) ≤ I
(2)
AE .
Before analyzing the performance of the heralded source, it will be helpful to
revisit, using Eq. (14) as the starting point, the bounds on minimum transmission
for a perfect single-photon source and weak coherent pulses obtained by Brassard et
al. in Ref. 5. In the case of an ideal single photon source, we haveQ = dB/(T+2dB).
Using this expression we can transform Eq. (14) to the form T > T
(1)
min, where the
minimum transmission for a perfect single-photon source (y = 1), denoted below
as T
(1)
min, is given by
T
(1)
min = dB
1− 2Qth
Qth
. (15)
For WCPs, we need to transform Eq. (14) into a lower bound on T and
then minimize it over the average photon number, which yields the optimal
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Fig. 2. Contour plots of the renormalized key rate for (a) BB84 and (b) SARG04 protocols. In
(b), the parameter region not satisfying the assumption I
(1)
AE(Q/y) < I
(2)
AE is blanked out and
separated with a dashed line. The thick solid lines (red online) depict the linearized necessary
condition for the key security given in Eq. (14).
λ
(C)
opt = [2dB(1− 2Qth)/Qthξ]1/2 and the minimum transmission is equal to
T
(C)
min =
(
2dBξ(1 − 2Qth)
Qth
)1/2
. (16)
This expression scales as d
1/2
B for the dark count probabilities dB ≪ 1 and therefore
is much larger than T
(1)
min, which depends linearly on dB .
An analogous procedure can be applied to a heralded single photon source.
Neglecting terms of the order of p2q2 in formulas Eqs. (5) and (6) and inserting them
along with Eq. (7) into Eq. (14) gives the following constraint on the transmission
T :
T >
q2
2q1
ξλ+ dB
1− 2Qth
Qth
+ dB
1− 2Qth
Qth
q0
q1
1
λ
. (17)
The minimum value of the right hand side is achieved for
λ
(H)
opt =
(
2dB
1− 2Qth
ξQth
q0
q2
)1/2
. (18)
It is easy to see that the explicit expression for the minimum transmission which
guarantees secure communication with heralded single photon sources can be for-
mally represented as a combination of T
(1)
min and T
(C)
min defined, respectively, in
Eqs. (15) and (16):
T
(H)
min = dB
1− 2Qth
Qth
+
(
2dBξ
1− 2Qth
Qth
q0q2
q21
)1/2
=
= T
(1)
min +
(q0q2)
1/2
q1
T
(C)
min . (19)
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Fig. 3. Contour plots of the expression (q0q2)1/2/q1 as a function of dA and ηA with ηc = 98%
for (a) a binary detector and multiplexed detection with (b) N = 3 and (c) N = 4 stages.
For perfect photon number resolving detection, when q0q2 = 0, the minimum trans-
mission reaches T
(1)
min. It should be noted that if only one of the parameters q0 and
q2 is zero, the expression (18) becomes singular: either λ
(H)
opt → 0 implying that the
expected event rate goes to zero, or λ
(H)
opt → ∞, which means that generation of
multiple pairs is not harmful if they can be perfectly sifted out. On the other hand,
inserting q0 = q1 = q2 = 1 into Eq. (19) recovers in the leading order of dB the
weak coherent pulse value T
(C)
min .
For realistic parameter values we have T
(C)
min ≫ T
(1)
min due to less favorable scaling
with dB . Therefore, the factor (q0q2)
1/2/q1 appearing in Eq. (19) will define the
usefulness of a heralded single photon source in QKD: the lower its value, the longer
the achievable secure distance. As a quantitative illustration, in Fig. 3 we plot the
factor (q0q2)
1/2/q1 as a function of the detector efficiency ηA and the dark count
probability dA for a binary heralding detector and multiplexed detection discussed
in Sec. 3 with N = 3 and 4 stages. We see in Fig. 3(a) that binary heralding indeed
extends substantially the secure distance (equivalently, lowers the minimum secure
transmission) compared to the WCP scheme, as pointed out first by Brassard et
al.
5 For multiplexed heralding shown in Figs. 3(b) and 3(c), the factor (q0q2)
1/2/q1
increases. This means that the maximum secure distance is shortened compared to
binary heralding, but nevertheless remains much longer than in the WCP scheme.
When dA ≪ ηAηNc /(1− ηAηNc ), we can approximate
(q0q2)
1/2
q1
≈ d1/2A
(
1 + 2N+1
1− ηAηNc
ηAηNc
)1/2
. (20)
When comparing this result with binary detection (N = 0), we see that indeed
the increased rate of dark count events resulting from multiplying the number of
detectors overrides the benefits of photon number resolution, with the exception of
an unrealistic case when ηAη
N
c = 100%.
Although multiplexing fails to enhance the maximum secure distance achievable
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with heralded sources, it can bring benefits in the intermediate regime when the
WCP scheme is no longer secure. Namely, if the transmission of the channel remains
below T
(C)
min , but above the value T
(H)
min for multiplexed heralding, results of Sec. 3
suggest that multiplexing can be used as a relatively straightforward way to increase
the key rate above that offered by binary heralding. Numerical results presented in
the next section will confirm this observation.
5. Numerical results
In order to gain a more complete picture of the performance of analyzed QKD
protocols, we will now present numerical optimization of the key rate given in Eq. (1)
over λ, which has the interpretation of the average photon number for the weak
coherent pulse implementation and the pair production probability for a heralded
single photon source. This optimization needs to be carried out individually for each
overall transmission T of the optical channel. As a model for the photon number
resolving detector we use the multiplexing scheme described in Sec. 3.
The results for the BB84 protocol are shown in Fig. 4. As a reference, we plot
key rates attainable with WCPs and a heralded source employing a binary on/off
detector. As analyzed in Sec. 3, the critical parameter is the efficiency ηA of the
heralding detector. For sufficiently high efficiencies, multiplexing is beneficial over
a wide range of transmission, including the entire range when the weak coherent
pulse implementation offers security. For lower ηA, the optimal scheme over short
distances (i.e. high transmission) is to use WCPs. However, the corresponding se-
curity range is rather limited. Beyond that limit, for intermediate distances, mul-
tiplexing provides an advantage until security becomes compromised by increased
dark count rates. In the regime of very low transmissions, a heralded source with a
binary detector is the only setup that still warrants security.
The plots show that over a large part of the intermediate distance the approx-
imation from Sec. 3 still holds. Therefore Eq. (12) provides a simple method to
estimate the increase in the key rate when a multiplexing detector is used in lieu of
a binary one and to find the optimal number of multiplexing stages when couplers
are lossy. In Fig. 5 we depict the ratio of the key rates for an N -stage mutliplexed
heralding and binary heralding as a function of ηA calculated using Eq. (12), assum-
ing non-unit transmission of couplers equal to ηc = 98%. The optimum is achieved
for either N = 3 or N = 4 stages, depending on the efficiency ηA. Fig. 5 also
shows that this simple analytical derivation agrees quite well with enhancements
determined from fitting numerical results in the short-distance regions where the
key rate remains approximately proportional to T 2.
Fig. 6 shows analogous results for the SARG04 protocol assuming the specific
eavesdropping strategy discussed in Sec. 2. We found that for WCPs and low trans-
missions numerical optimization of the pulse amplitude took us outside the regime
when I
(1)
AE(Q/y) ≤ I
(2)
AE , therefore we depict here only results for a heralded single
photon source and compare performance of multiplexed and binary heralding. It is
July 5, 2018 11:51 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE herald-ijqi
12 M. Lasota et al.
Fig. 4. Log-log plots of key rates for the BB84 protocol as a function of the overall channel
transmission T calculated numerically for (a) ηA = 80%, (b) ηA = 60%, and (c) ηA = 40%.
Numerical results are shown for weak coherent pulses (×, green online), a binary heralding detector
(◦, red online), and a multiplexed heralding detector (+, blue online) with the number of stages
maximizing the key rate in the short distance regime (N = 4 for (a), N = 3 for (b) and (c)).
Other parameter values are ηc = 98%, dA = 10
−6, and dB = 10
−5. Solid lines depict the
analytical approximations of the key rates in the short distance regime obtained from Eq. (10).
Vertical dashed lines depict minimum transmissions calculated using Eq. (19). Line colors online
correspond to those of the numerical results.
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Fig. 5. The ratio of key rates for an N-stage mutliplexed heralding detector and a binary detector
as a function of ηA calculated using Eq. (12) for ηc = 98%, dA = 10
−6, and N = 2 (dotted line,
orange online) N = 3 (solid line, blue online), N = 4 (dashed line, green online) and N = 5
(dot-dashed line, red online). Symbols × depict results obtained by fitting numerical data (using
linear regression method) to the model K ∝ T 2 for the optimal numbers of splitting stages: N = 3
for ηA = 40% and ηA = 60%, and N = 4 for ηA = 80%.
seen that again multiplexing is more beneficial for high heralding efficiencies but
leads to a reduction of the maximum secure distance.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the potential advantages of realistic heralded single pho-
ton sources in quantum key distribution based on four-state qubit protocols. We
identified the characteristics of detectors used for heralding that is relevant to the
performance of QKD protocols, including the key rates in the high-transmission
limit when dark counts can be neglected, as well as the minimum transmission
that still ensures key security. This can be used to evaluate the usefulness of new
approaches to achieve photon number resolution,3,31 such as multipixel32,33 or
superconducting34 detectors.
The results were specialized to the case of multiplexing detectors, which offer
partial photon number resolution while adding relatively little extra complexity to
the experimental setup compared to binary on/off detection. We found that increas-
ing the key rate above that attainable with weak coherent pulses poses stringent
requirements on the overall efficiency in the heralding arm of the SPDC setup,
including collection efficiency of down-converted photons. However, the implemen-
tation based on weak coherent pulses has a very restricted security range, and be-
yond this limit multiplexing can increase the key rate compared to binary heralding.
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Fig. 6. Log-log plots of key rates for the SARG04 protocol as a function of the overall channel
transmission T calculated numerically for (a) ηA = 80%, (b) ηA = 60%, and (c) ηA = 40%.
Numerical results are shown for a binary heralding detector (◦, red online) and a multiplexed
heralding detector (+, blue online) with the number of stages maximizing the key rate in the
short distance regime (N = 4 for (a), N = 3 for (b) and (c)). Other parameter values are
ηc = 98%, dA = 10
−6, and dB = 10
−5. Solid lines depict the analytical approximations of the key
rates in the short distance regime obtained from Eq. (10). Vertical dashed lines depict minimum
transmissions calculated using Eq. (19). Line colors online correspond to those of the numerical
results.
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Unfortunately, for very long distances (i.e. low transmissions), the increased dark
count rate of the multiplexing scheme jeopardizes security leaving the single binary
detector as the only option.
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